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Review Essay:  
New directions in Queer Theory:  
Recent theorizing in the work of  
Lynne Huffer, Leo Bersani and Adam Phillips,  
and Lauren Berlant and Lee  Edelman. 
Nancy Harding 
Gender, Work and Organization (Forthcoming) 
I grew up in a small mining village in the South Wales Valleys where godliness 
was a distant second behind cleanliness in the morality stakes. A clean house 
was far more important than going to chapel if the family was to be ‘respectable’. 
My mother (housework was always the woman’s work) did not keep a clean and 
tidy house or clean and well-fed children, and I bore an incapacitating stain on 
my psyche of  ‘growing up dirty’ until long after I began my academic career in 
my 30s. Sometime after my 40th birthday I struggled to tell one of my new 
academic friends my guilty secret, scared that they would not want to continue a 
friendship with such an execrable person. When I later stumbled across queer 
theory I found authors articulating a similar deep, deep sense of shame (see, 
especially, Sedgwick, 2003, Ch. One). I had found a language that helped me to 
understand the ways in which intense shame can permeate one’s sense of self. 
In ‘coming out’ as having grown up in squalor I wonder what other stigmas are 
suffered by people who lack a language in which to articulate, understand and 
challenge their lonely humiliation.  In terms of management and organization 
studies (MOS), what forms of shame do organizations enact upon the bodies and 
psyches of staff, and how can academics develop a politics and language through 
which to articulate and fight against that shame? We perhaps need a new ‘shame’ 
or ‘stigma’ theory within MOS, that identifies and fights against ways in which 
workplaces render subjects abject. Queer theory cannot do this, focusing as it 
does on sex and sexualities. Although Butler (1993), writes that though her focus 
is on gender her theories can be applied in other domains, Sedgwick (quoted in 
Halle, 2004, p. 10) is adamant that ‘Given the historical and contemporary force 
of the prohibitions against every same-sex sexual expression, for anyone to 
 2 
disavow those meanings, or to displace them from the term’s definitional center, 
would be to dematerialize any possibility of queerness itself’. There are 
arguments against reducing queer studies to lesbian and gay studies (Halperin, 
1995; Giffney, 2004) but sex remains the focus of queer theory. 
However, current developments in queer theory suggest the possibilities of 
broadening queer theory’s reach in MOS. The texts reviewed here take queer 
theory in a new direction, and in so doing offer a rationale for what I call an 
organizational sexology influenced by queer theory.  That is, the authors 
demonstrate ways of theorizing from sex acts that, I will argue, opens 
possibilities for theorizing from sex and sex acts in organizations. 
Where queer theory’s original focus was inspired to develop a politics of 
freedom by Foucault’s (1979; 1986; 1992) three volumes on The History of 
Sexuality, the texts analysed find inspiration in another aspect of Foucault’s late 
work, that of an ethics of the self.  They either explicitly (Bersani, 2008; Huffer 
(2013) or implicitly (Berlant and Edelman, 2014) explore Foucault’s advocacy of 
new relational modes. Foucault advocated an ethics of the self located in an ‘ego-
divesting discipline’. This aims to remove the violence that informs the modern 
Western subject’s struggle to attain subjectivity.  Put simply, to be a modern 
Western subject requires that one aggressively pursues one’s own ego identity, 
and this pursuit requires that we trample all over other people. Ethical action 
requires the dissolution of the ego, and thus the de-individuation of the ‘I’.  The 
texts reviewed here use sex acts as the inspiration for developing such an ethics 
of the self. I will suggest below that although dissolution of the ego in 
organizations is probably unwise, these authors’ inspirational analysis of and 
from sex offers a new and valuable mode of theorizing we can use as  
management and organization theorists without diluting the political power of 
queer theory.  
First I will outline how these ideas are developed in recent works by Lynn Huffer 
(2013), Leo Bersani (with Adam Phillips, 2008) and Edelman and Berlant (2014)i, 
before exploring their implications for organization studies. 
Lynne Huffer: Are the lips a grave? 
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Lynne Huffer’s (2013) Are the lips a grave? A queer feminist on the ethics of sex, 
pays homage to Leo Bersani’s famous essay, Is the rectum a grave? (2010, first 
published in 1987). We need a brief detour to discuss that essay in order to 
understand Huffer’s work and, indeed, Bersani’s more recent writing discussed 
below. In Is the rectum a grave? Bersani began to critique ‘the sacrosanct value of 
[a] selfhood’ (Bersani, 2010:30) that leads human beings to the masculine 
endeavour of killing others in order to protect a self that is no more than ‘a 
practical convenience, promoted to the status of an ethical ideal’ that sanctions 
violence’ (ibid). He recognized in that essay that this self is shattered during sex, 
pointing the way towards an understanding of the possibilities for dissipating 
the ego that inform his and other’s later workii. But the focus of Bersani’s early 
essay was a deconstruction of masculinities and masculine ideals. His essay is a 
sophisticated discussion of the relationship between sex, power and domination, 
in which he observes how social structures (which, of course, include 
organizations) may be derivations and sublimations of this indissociable 
relationship between sexual pleasure and poweriii.  
In that early essay Bersani asked difficult questions about the common 
understanding amongst lesbian and gay authors that homosexuality is a 
politically subversive practice – he argued that sexual identity and politics are 
not necessarily inter-related.  Huffer follows Bersani’s example, but in her case 
she questions the ideal of female sisterhood – it is, she argues, the ‘abject residue 
of an ideal we repeatedly fail to achieve’ (p. 5). After tracing the falling-out 
between feminism and queer theory, Huffer seeks to re-unite them through an 
anti-foundationalist queer feminist ethics. She starts this endeavour by drawing 
on philosophers such as Butler and novelists such as Collette to develop the 
ethical question: ‘how can the other reappear at the site of her inscriptional 
effacement?’ (p. 54). That is, and here she echoes Spivak’s (1988) ‘Can the 
subaltern speak’, the subordinated party in binaries such as man/woman, 
gay/straight, manager/worker is not allowed to speak, think or have identity 
save within and through the discourses of the dominant party. Huffer poses the 
question: how can subordinated subjects appear in their own image rather 
through those abjected and subordinated ones bestowed on them by the 
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powerful? She finds inspiration in a ‘Foucauldian fascination with 
desubjectivation and what self-undoing might mean’ (p 56), that is, Foucault’s 
attempt, in The Use of Pleasure (1986) and The Care of the Self, (1992) to ‘get free 
of oneself’ through rethinking the self as a technology or practice (p. 87).  
This involves firstly questioning the issue of the (female) subject. The woman, 
she argues, is in a place of ‘absolute alterity’: her otherness means she does not 
exist because she ‘has been obliterated by the aestheticizing moves of 
representation’ (p. 140). She cannot therefore speak, Huffer writes, but then she 
questions that statement and finds it erroneous: although she who is unheard 
occupies the place of ‘the unread, the unheard, the illegible’, she becomes unread 
and unheard through a politics of ‘multiple, modulated silences over time’ (p 
141). It is this politics that renders those who speak from the place of the other 
not silenced but unheard.  The queer feminist ethics that Huffer calls for therefore 
demands that stories are rewritten so that those who have been rendered un-
hearable by power are able to speak and be heard. But hearing (and reading) is 
not a simple process of transmission/reception, she argues, and alongside 
understanding the abjected party in the binary, the subject who has been 
unheard, we must also understand the dominant party, the subject who will not 
hear. This dominant subject for Huffer is the ‘modern, moral, Western subject 
that lurks behind most everything we do, even when we try to dismiss him’ (p. 
179).  A problem for all of us is that this subject is ‘an ethical ideal’, one we are 
encouraged to strive to equate ourselves with, if not to become.  
The cleverness of Huffer’s argument lies in her argument that the Western 
subject is a split subject that incorporates both a judgemental, moral, masculine, 
Western self (the super-ego, in Freudian terms) and a silenced, inferiorised, 
unheard self. Queer theory traditionally locates these oppositional positions in 
two separate individuals, the subordinate one cowed by a dominant other that 
depends on the abjected other to sustain its knowledge of its self as normative 
(Jagose, 1997).  Huffer understands the individual subject as someone who 
moves between dominant and subordinate subject positions, and thus judges self 
and others in condemnatory and destructive ways at the same time as feeling 
condemned and destroyed by those very discourses that they articulate. 
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She illuminates this through a discussion of work/life balance, contrasting her 
own ‘queer feminist “life”’ with that of the ‘life’ imagined in the work/life balance 
literature. That life, her reading shows, is a heteronormative life, lived in a 
specific type of family, one that is elevated to an ethical ideal. This modern 
subject (a parent/worker who struggles for a balance between work and ‘life’) is 
figured as modernity’s subject, that is, one that is disciplined in all aspects of its 
life, both work and leisure. Those who cannot achieve this normative, impossible, 
disciplined subjectivity are rendered abject, as Huffer admits about herself, even 
as she finds herself struggling to conform with an ideal that she abhors. But 
‘there must be other ways of thinking about life’ (p. 180), she suggests, where 
‘life’ is not the terrain only of those who live within nuclear families.  
Thus Huffer’s thesis explores how modern Western subjectivities are embedded 
in and imbued with a violence that limits their potential for becoming.  She 
develops this argument from an identity as a queer feminist who is exploring the 
potential of Foucault’s advocacy of an ethics of the self  found in new modes of 
being that require undoing of subjectivity, or the ego. Huffer does not illuminate 
how we may do this, but her work sets the scene for a recent text by Leo Bersani, 
that explores how the self may be shattered by its self. 
Leo Bersani: Intimacies 
The ideas Leo Bersani articulates in some depth in 2008 were already emerging 
in his early work in 1990 (Dasgupta, 2009), and were also there, as we have seen 
above, in his 1987 essay.  In 2008 he addressed the undoing of subjectivities  
more directly. In this work, Bersani looks to psychoanalysis as an ‘inspiration for 
modes of exchange that can only take place outside of psychoanalysis’ (p.4). He 
works towards articulating a mode of exchange in which one subject is deeply 
listened to by the other. For Bersani, this is jouissance, that is, ‘giving and 
receiving, through embodied language, the subjecthood of others’ (p. 29). This 
act requires that we learn how to forget about the ‘I’ who awaits its own turn to 
speak and thus affirm its self-hood, and become instead a listener that forgets it 
is a separate and individual self: all there is is a listener listening. 
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Bersani’s first task is to analyse how the ‘I’s’ demand to be a self inhibits that 
jouissance. He argues that the ego’s focus solely on fulfilling the desire of the I to 
become fully itself leads the subject to demand far more from the other than the 
other can give. The result, always, is failure.  The ‘I’, rather than attaching to a 
subject, attaches to a yearning desire.  That is, there is a yearning desire (for 
identity) that articulates itself as the ‘I’ or ‘me’.  
Bersani then turns to the unsafe sexual practice known as ‘barebackingiv’. He 
explores barebacking as ‘the ascesis of an ego-divesting discipline’ (p. 35), that is, 
an ascetic discipline in which the desiring ‘I’ gives way and is ‘replaced, inhabited 
by the other’. He introduces the concept of ‘pure love’ (p. 52), wherein the 
subject disappears and there is only acting, but acting without an actor.  In other 
words, rather than, say, a guitarist playing a guitar, woman and musical 
instrument are so merged that there is nothing but a guitar being played – music 
is playing.  Barebacking becomes a metaphor for the subject who ‘allows himself 
to be penetrated, even replaced, by an unknowable otherness’ (53), and so is 
‘overwhelmed by the massive anonymous presence’ to which the subject has 
surrendered itself (p. 54). The ego, importantly, is not annihilated but 
disseminated. Thus the yearning desire for self-hood can dissolve.  
His argument therefore concerns recognition of sameness rather than difference: 
‘the experience of belonging to a family of singularity without national, ethnic, 
racial, or gendered borders might make us sensitive to the ontological status of 
difference itself’ (p. 86). Thus barebacking offers a metaphor for the giving up of 
the concept of the ‘I’ and the ‘me’, the selfish self with all its demands and its 
violence towards others in its desire for assurance of its own existence. Instead, 
by collapsing the boundaries between the self and others through receptiveness 
and deep listening to the other, the conditions through which stigmatized 
identities are constituted disappear, because when there is no identity, there is 
no dominant subject that relies on an abjected other in order to exist.  
Huffer and Bersani therefore use sex (for Huffer her identity as a queer feminist, 
for Bersani the act of barebacking) to offer a distinct challenge to the category of 
the self in Western culture. Huffer inspires understanding of the self as a split 
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subject that judges and chastises its self and others, implying that the self is 
somehow complicit in its own subordination even as it subordinates and is 
subordinated by others. Bersani points the way towards overcoming the fear and 
pain of this subjectivising of subjects through challenging the ego’s rule.  For 
Bersani, all judgement about the other, including the internalized other, should 
dissolve – rather than difference there would be sameness, with each partner in 
a discussion actively listened to and nurtured. Berlant and Edelman (2014) 
argue somewhat similarly, but they explore some of the problems of de-
individualising the Western subject.   
Lauren Berlant and Lee Edelman, Sex, or the Unbearable 
Sex, or the Unbearable (2014), takes the form of a conversation between Berlant 
and Edelman that evolves through its chapters.  Sex is for these authors a site 
from which to explore ‘the scene of relationality by focusing on the “negativity” 
that can make it so disturbing’ (p. i). Sex, again, is a metaphor for undoing: 
through its intense relation with an other the ‘subject’s fantasmatic sovereignty’ 
(p. 2) disintegrates, the self (temporarily) dissipatesv.  They explore the 
implications of this through a dialogue that, they suggest, commits them to 
‘grappling with negativity, nonsovereignty, and social relation not only as 
abstract concepts but also as the substance and condition of our responses – and 
our responsibilities – to each other’ (p. ix). That is, how can we (that is, the 
yearning, aching sovereign ‘I’) become ethically undone through interaction with 
others, absorbed into and by them as Bersani advocates, when we are fearful of 
such undoing and erect strong barriers against it?  This, for me, is what they 
contribute to Huffer’s and Bersani’s arguments: a more intense exploration of 
subjectivities and the implications for achieving impersonal narcissism.   
But in addition these two authors offer an intense and highly insightful account 
of inter-actions between two subjects that, I suggest, could be fruitfully applied 
to understanding encounters in organizations. They show some of the 
complexities of relationality: it is violent, pleasurable, productive, a scene of 
fantasy and misrecognition, all these and more. It is, as Berlant writes (p. 112), a 
‘converging that is inseparable from abandonment, movement within varieties of 
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intense stuckness, and foreclosing gestures that are also openings’. Subjects both 
desire attachment but also resist it, but because all encounters lie within 
signifying systems we cannot avoid the negativity that informs each and every 
encounter. But, as Edelman argues, although misrecognition is inevitable we 
must fight against it. Thus ‘Challenging the fixity of “me” and “you” and 
“everyone we know”’ through such conversations enacts a life-generating 
resistance (or negativity) (115).  What, then, of the encounter between, say, 
manager and staff member? But that is for the future.  
To return to the present discussion: whilst Berlant’s phenomenology and 
Edelman’s psychoanalysis is different they share with each other and with Huffer 
and Bersani an understanding that the subject is abjected and subordinated by 
(aggressive) social norms, and that nonsovereignty, or the undoing of the self, 
offers a politics of hope. Where Bersani seemed to explore the becoming-ethical 
of a self somehow isolated from the social, Berlant and Edelman plunge us 
directly into the scene of encounter. Their goal is thus similar to both Huffer’s 
and Bersani’s, but their aim is to better understand the barriers to and 
difficulties of achieving a dissolution of the self, and their method is a highly 
reflexive analysis of an encounter between themselves as two subjectivities.  
They explore their disagreements and failures to agree, because these are 
‘indispensable to our efforts to think relationality’ (p. ix). They find themselves 
negative about and resistanct towards the fixity of social forms, and explore how 
their relationality is beset with ‘valences of social intensities and fantasies, [and] 
contradictory pressures implicit in established forms of relation’ (p. xiii).   
In Edelman’s words (p. 69): ‘The encounter performed by this dialogue centers 
on the question of encounter as such: how to live relationality; how to confront 
our self-division; how to experience the unbearable undoing of the logic that 
binds us to the world; how to share a thought or an object when the pressure of 
its handling by another risks breaking the object, our willingness to share it, or 
our ability to cathect it’.  
Berlant and Edelman’s interrogation of conversation, or a conversation about 
their conversations, leads Edelman to write that conversation ‘marks the site of a 
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potential encounter with the unbearable, with the otherness that permits no 
relation despite our best efforts to construct one’ (p. 98), and because the other 
is always an irreducible other (p. 100), they always remain separate and distinct 
– there can be no absorption of one in the other, no dispersal of the ego, as 
Bersani longs for. Berlant’s response however is that conversation ‘does require 
nonsovereignty whether or not it feels otherwise or is marked manifestly by 
controlling gestures’ (p. 99). Her position is closer to Bersani’s – that is, through 
speaking and listening we can, in some ways, give up the self and absorb the 
other’s subjectivity.  
Their discussions therefore place them in opposing positions.  Edelman’s 
argument is that the impossibility of ever knowing the other renders impossible 
the undoing of one’s self through interaction with the other, and Berlant’s is that 
the very possibility of conversation requires that one undoes one’s self through 
absorbing into the self aspects of the other (their words, their ideas, their 
presence). But Edelman offers some reconciliation: although he is loyal to his 
perspective that conversation concerns sequences of missed encounters in 
which we cannot fathom, understand, grasp or hold the other, he nonetheless 
shifts his position by observing that his conversation with Berlant has shown 
him that despite the irreducibility of the other it is possible to bring something 
into being through conversation. Although he and Berlant occupy differing 
linguistic worlds, somehow they have managed to produce something new, and 
this is because, he suggests, they have in some ways ‘broken down the 
structuring fantasy of the subject’ (p. 108), by which I understand that each has 
forced the other to reconsider their concept of who they are. Thus, Edelman 
concludes, conversation (and other encounters) allow subjects to ‘encounter the 
possibility of coming apart’ (p. 109).      
Berlant elaborates on this position. Yes, encounters are unstable and there is 
mutual misrecognition, but are these not the very conditions that require 
exploring if we are to understand relationality?  To enter into such encounters, 
to get inside them, is risky but the risk may lead to the ‘attunement’ of 
‘collaborative ordinariness’ (p. 110) that makes up the everyday. That is, ‘sex, 
activism, stranger encounters, reading – any collaborative practice – are not just 
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performances of disavowal of the object’s placeholderness but scenes of a drama 
of attention in which we seek to work our relationality, which is a task alongside 
of our aims to explain, maintain, and control the encounter’ (ibid). Although most 
encounters are forgettable, those more demanding encounters, with lovers, 
friends, colleagues, workers or disciplinary agent, that is, ‘anyone whose 
satisfaction matters’, reveal how we want more but are afraid of losing what we 
have.  There is thus ‘structural generativity’ in this ‘worlding work’ of 
relationality (p. 111). ‘To me’, she writes, ‘the great pleasure of any collaboration 
is multiplying idioms and infrastructures for further thoughts that neither of us 
could have generated alone’ (ibid). And indeed there are no alternatives to such 
world-building.  
There is thus a compromise position. In Edelman’s words (p. 116) ‘In sex, in 
politics, in theory – in any infrastructure that we can call intimate or invested 
with the activity of living – we cannot banish the strangeness in ourselves or of 
anything in the world. While we can point to the impossibility of staying reliable 
to one’s self- and other-directed relations and to the impact of the ways we fail 
them, though, these contacts can spark new forms of life, of being in the scene of 
relationality’. So the ‘opening up of the encounter between negativity and 
nonsovereignty’ leads Edelman to an understanding of how sex ‘breaks us down 
in multiple, nonidentical ways, all of which are in a complex relation to the 
fantasy of relation itself’ (p. 117).    
Edelman and Berlant use sex (see the book’s title) as a way of exploring 
subjectivity, identity and how we become undone within that scene of 
relationality in which we achieve subjectivity and identity.  
 
Discussion 
  
These three texts together point to new directions in queer theory that focus on 
Foucault’s advocacy of an ethics of the self located in the dissolution of the ego. 
Each of the texts uses sex and sex acts as the inspiration for or trajectory of their 
arguments. Huffer, theorizing from her own queer relationship, analyses how the 
ego informs the seemingly banal and every-day world of work – there is a 
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version of the ‘ideal ego’ evident in organizations, and those who cannot achieve 
it are excluded or excludable. Her argument that individual psyches are located 
within both sides of the binary, that is, individuals are both oppressors and 
oppressed, takes us to Bersani’s advocacy, via the example of the sexual act of 
barebacking, of a new relational model of being that involves dissolution of the 
ego so that self and others merge (Dollimore [1998) and Dean [2000] have 
argued similarly). Berlant and Edelman acknowledge that there is very little sex 
in their discussion, which focuses on the intercourse of conversation or non-
sexual intercourse, but their text is redolent with sexual metaphors. All these 
authors also remain true to queer theory’s original political imperative – there is 
no danger that they will water down its power to challenge heteronormativity. It 
is perhaps this latter point that has limited queer theory’s (rather than LGBT 
theory’s) use in organization studies: how can organizational theorists draw on 
queer theory without damaging the work’s political project?  
There are therefore two aspects to these texts of note: the way in which the 
theory is developed, and the theory that emerges from reading these accounts 
together.  I suggest the methodology is relevant to MOS, but the theory is not. 
The methodology, however, points towards an organizational sexology 
influenced by queer theory. It suggests the fruitfulness of using sexual acts that 
take place in organizations as ways of thinking differently about and generating 
new insights into organizations.  
Sex may be everywhere in organizations, (Burrell, 1984;  Hearn and Parkin, 
1987) but material, embodied sex acts are seemingly absent except at the 
margins – at Christmas parties, conferences and behind locked doors.  If theory is 
not queer without sex as its subject and object, where then lie the prospects for 
queer theory (rather than lesbian, gay and transgender studies) in organization 
studies?  I suggest that any acts of coitus in organizations are queer, regardless of 
the biological sex of the participants. That is, desire, and the desire to be sexually 
desired, walks organizations’ corridors and workspaces (see Harding, Lee, Ford 
and Learmonth, 2011, for a discussion). But coitus is hidden or excluded, with 
career damage or job loss the penalties for being caught in flagrante delicto.   
Thus sex is everywhere in organizations but only in the form of libidinal energy: 
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coitus is suppressed, shameful, out of place, stigmatised – it is queer sex because 
it brands participants with marks of shame and identifies them as miscreants, 
bringing punishment on the heads of those ‘caught’.  Thus when physical acts of 
sex in organizations come to light, they offer opportunities for developing new 
understanding and, perhaps, a new politics. 
Take, for example, the case of Commander West, the first female commander of a 
British warship, who in 2014 was removed from her post after her sexual 
relationship with a male colleague had been discoveredvi. There is no news about 
action taken against the man involved in this affairvii, but Commander West 
became the subject of much discussion in the British media.   This is a report of 
heterosexual sex between a woman and a man, but the abjection of at least one 
of the parties, her ‘outing’ as a sexual being and the subsequent damage to her 
career, suggests that the situation merits a queer interpretation.  Space allows 
only a brief analysis (see Fotaki and Harding, forthcoming, for a longer 
discussion).  
Firstly, Commander West broke the requirement of organizations that staff 
desexualize themselves at work (even while the libidinal energy of desire may be 
desired), and there is something very old-fashioned about this – that open-ness 
about sex since the ‘sexual liberation’ movement of the 1960s is absent from 
workplaces save as banter and joking. Could this be an unexplored form of 
control that may allow better understanding of control? When that denatured 
object, ‘the’ organization, threatens sanctions of shame upon those who dare 
disobey, does it enact a mechanism of control against which resistance may be 
particularly difficult, because fighting against such controls requires that one 
‘comes out’ as having committed those organizationally-defined crimes and thus 
one marks one’s self as abject and dirty?  Is resistance, perhaps, difficult because 
it dirties the self? 
Secondly, Commander West worked in an environment that, in folklore and song, 
is regarded as rife with hidden sexual activities.  That is, sex is everywhere in the 
navy but its presence is denied. When this denial becomes unsustainable, as in 
Commander West’s case, the making public of what should be hidden brings 
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calumny upon the head of the (female but dominant) perpetrator because she 
has revealed that which cannot be acknowledged.   What theories, then, might 
emerge from organizational spaces where sex is even while it is not? What sort of 
places might those be and can the ways in which sex is controlled, subordinated 
and invisibilised within them help us to a new understanding of organizations?  
Finally, does Commander West’s case offer a metaphor for understanding 
continuing inequalities between women and men in organizations? If, say, 
leadership and the leader can be understood only as impenetrable, disembodied 
and devoid of passion, desire or attraction, does the penetrable female body 
when it occupies a senior position threaten to undermine the edifice of Western 
management principles? If the leader is penetrable, can management’s place in 
the hierarchy become delegitimized? Relatedly, what fears of the powerful, 
penetrative woman come to conscious expression in such an example? 
These questions arise from the evidence of one sexual act, and there are many 
other questions that it poses. But I am suggesting that all acts of coitus in 
organizations are queer sexual acts because they carry a fear of discovery that 
will bring down shame and calumny upon anyone caught in the act. This means 
that, just as Bersani, in particular, has taken one sexual act, barebacking, and 
developed its implications in unexpected ways, we can perhaps theorise from 
sexual activities in organizations in order to develop a different understanding of 
organizations and what it means to be human when employed by them.   
But what about the other implication of these queer works for organizations, the 
possibilities that might arise from letting go of the ego and merging with others 
so as to bring about a more ethical social world? I hesitate to advocate such a 
thing, because I am not sure of what may be one’s ego while at the workplace.  
Within process theories of organization (see the papers in Helin et al, 2014, for a 
discussion) there are some hints that self and organization merge in processes of 
mutual becoming, so that the self is undone, inundated psychically and 
emotionally, by ‘the organization’viii. Rather than there being an impersonal 
narcissistic ego, there is one that is, perhaps, an impersonal organizational ego in 
which the organization possesses the subject and speaks through that subject’s 
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mouth. Letting go of the self may therefore offer fertile territory for the greater 
penetration of the organization into the self, something we cannot advocate. But 
do Bersani’s arguments hint at ways in which we can repel that organization that 
desires to take up occupation of our egos? Can the form of exploration 
undertaken by Berlant and Edelman help us better understand the becoming of 
the self as organizational self? Until we understand the terms that enable and 
inhibit our becoming as organizational actors, we perhaps should not aspire to 
letting go of the ego for fear of how power works on the organizational ego.  
However, the ethical turn in queer theory should not only give us cause to halt 
and consider how organizations predicate against ethical action even as they 
espouse corporate social responsibility, it offers a new way of thinking about 
organizations, and organizational ethics, that deserves further exploration.     
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i There is no specific rationale for the choice of these texts. I came across them 
when doing a literature search to update myself on recent developments in 
queer theory, and was impressed at their scholarship and profundity of thought.  
  
 
iii Of interest is Bersani’s note that ‘the idea of penis envy describes how men feel 
about having one, and, as long as there are sexual relations between men and 
women, this can’t help but be an important fact for women’. (p. 23).   
 
 
 
vi See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-28700446 
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vii  See http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2720931/Royal-Navy-blasted-
disgracefully-sexist-firing-woman-warship-captain-alleged-affair.html. 
 
viii I argued this through exploring the account of a manager who had been made 
redundant and found work in another organization (Harding, 2003). 
